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This paper explores some cooperative aspects of investments in uncertain, real options. Key 
production factors are assumed transferable. They may reflect property or user rights. Emission 
of pollutants and harvest of renewable resources are cases in point. Of particular interest are 
alternative projects or technologies that provide inferior but anti-correlated returns. Any such 
project stabilizes the aggregate proceeds. Therefore, given widespread risk exposure and 
aversion, that project’s worth may embody an extra bonus. The setting is formalized as a 
stochastic production game. Granted no economies of scale such games are quite tractable in 
analysis, computation, and realization. A core imputation comes in terms of contingent shadow 
prices that equilibrate competitive, endogenous markets. The said prices emerge as optimal dual 
solutions to coordinated production programs, featuring pooled resources - and also via adaptive 
procedures. Extra value - or an insurance premium - adds to any project whose yield is 
negatively associated with the aggregate. 
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The actual management of natural resources and ecosystems inspires great concerns
with sustainability and welfare. Notably, the possible depletion of shared stocks,
and the emission of harmful pollutants into commons, gives rise to legitimate worries
about eﬃciency and equity.
Typically the related industries must make heavy investments ex ante that cannot
easily be undone or recouped ex post. Also, net returns may be rather uncertain in
magnitude and somewhat distant in time.1 Together these facts beg for thorough
investment analysis, emphasizing precaution and the value of keeping options alive.
For such analysis, presuming relevant data, several disciplines have much to oﬀer.
First, and maybe foremost, comes economics of ﬁnance and insurance. Second, since
one cannot avoid computation altogether, there is, in principle, no escape from opti-
mization theory. Third, and somewhat surprisingly, since exchanges may be implicit
or lurking in the background, so-called production (or market) games can elucidate
multi-agent interaction.
It is seldom though, to ﬁnd all these ingredients in one and the same study.
Most analysts contend with the restricted perspective (and the partial analysis) that
1Important references include [1], [2], [6], [7], [8], and [17].
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suits a single agent, situated within well deﬁned markets. Easily ignored then is the
endogenous nature of allocations and prices. Also troublesome is the possible absence
of markets for inputs, products or risks. Such absence greatly aﬀects the willingness to
invest in large-scale projects, promising fairly unpredictable and ”belated” dividends.
This paper deals with projects of precisely that sort. Besides, it accommodates
many agents, each acting in three roles: as consumer, investor and producer. At
the outset each owns a separate project, oﬀering him uncertain returns. Our main
purpose is to ”compute” the total and marginal value of investing in those projects.
As will become clear, such values are interdependent, subject to contingencies, and
determined endogenously. Especially interesting are projects whose net returns swing
”out-of-phase” with the aggregate. Their yield is ”up” precisely when the total pro-
ceeds are ”down”. That convenient feature confers extra mark-ups on their values.
Technologies of such ”counter-cyclical” sort abound, but they tend to cost more.
Examples include:
• selective gears for harvesting multi-species, multi-cohort ﬁsh stocks;
• diversiﬁcation over crops and livestock, and ecological production in agriculture;
• electricity production based on wind, biomass or solar energy.
In each case the alternative technology is costlier to operate, but it better safeguards
the environment.
F o rm o r ec o n c r e t ee x a m p l e sc o n s i d e rtwo arrangements for electricity generation.
In the ﬁrst, suppose all plants are driven by hydro-power. Some depend on highly cor-
related, short term precipitation; they are well furnished in chilly, wet years. Other,
more expensive plants merely tap melting water under a glacier; they are best oﬀ in
warm, dry years. Given aggregate supply commitments, the two groups can mutu-
ally insure each other. Such insurance ex post aﬀects investments ex ante. In the
second arrangement, suppose the base load be delivered by thermal/nuclear plants.
Hydro-power then acts only as swing producer; it serves peak demand and receives a
marked-up price. Again, prudent investments will be aﬀected throughout the sector.
To study such features Section 2 introduces the prototypical agent. Section 3
places several of them into a two-stage, cooperative setting, aﬀected by much uncer-
tainty. Brought out there are core solutions ex ante and ex post, both determined
by shadow prices. Section 4 oﬀers some novel qualitative results, akin to covariance-
pricing in ﬁnance. Section 5 illustrates a few insights about parallel projects, and
Section 6 brieﬂy discusses comparative risk advantages. Section 7 considers attain-
ment of equilibrium in environmental games, and Section 8 concludes.
This paper addresses at least three types of readers. Included are ﬁrst, economists,
not quite aware of the rich opportunities production games oﬀer, be it in positive or
normative way; second, ﬁnance/insurance analysts,l i t t l ec o n c e r n e dw i t hL a g r a n g i a n
duality; and ﬁnally, optimizers, not fully conversant with the cooperative aspects of
such duality.Investment, Uncertainty, and Production Games 3
2. The Risk-Exposed Agent
Considered here is a prototypical agent, being at once consumer, investor, and pro-
ducer. His decisions evolve step-wise as described next:
Right now install capacity or capital k.
; Next, observe the state ω ∈ Ω and a contingent resource endowment e(ω).
; Thereafter, adjust the capital stock by ∆k and acquire resources r.
; Go on to produce output f(k,ω,∆k,r).
; Finally, consume c and collect payoﬀ π(k,ω,∆k,r,c).
Often k ≤ ¯ k where the prescribed upper bound ¯ k reﬂects natural limits or some
historical right bestowed on the agent at hand. Examples are manifold. The table
below indicates some instances:

   

sector : choice k : threshold ¯ k : uncertain ω or e(ω)
hydropower water reservoir environmental limit precipitation
ﬁsheries catch capacity historical right stock abundance
pollution abatement capacity target level nature’s tolerance
agriculture density of lifestock regulation disease/pest

   

In any case, the realization ω remains unknown at the time when k is chosen. By
contrast, ∆k,r,c are contingent decisions; that is, they depend on the pair (k,ω).
At this point two modelling issues come up. The ﬁrst concerns dimensionality,
the second uncertainty.R e g a r d i n g t h e ﬁrst, we may easily accommodate several
sorts of capacities, resources and products, increasing thereby the dimension of the
decision spaces. Doing so entails, in principle, no additional cost, be it in analysis or
presentation (albeit of course in computation).2 In fact, the reader may choose freely
whether to regard some items as vectors or real numbers. For intuition it simpliﬁes
though, to deal merely with one-dimensional spaces.3
The second modelling issue concerns perception of risk and uncertainty. This bears
of course on what is known, unknown and unknowable [16]. We take a ”simplistic”
stand here, assuming that uncertainty amounts (and reduces) to a probabilistic de-
scription of possible ω-values. Then, at one extreme end, one may posit that the
probability distribution of ω be known by each and every concerned party. This hy-
pothesis is certainly convenient, but hardly realistic. So, in lack of such knowledge,
at the other extreme (and decisively more realistic) end, one may have to contend
with sequential realizations of ω, and the attending build-up of empirical statistics.
2Indeed, when k,¯ k are vectors in the same space, c reside in another linear space, and r maybe
in a third, corresponding vector inequalities should be understood to hold componentwise. And,
juxtaposition of two compatible vectors then implies that the standard inner product be executed.
3In extremis, one may read this paper as dealing merely with ﬁnancial markets.Investment, Uncertainty, and Production Games 4
We shall deal with both scenarios. In either case, E denotes the expectation oper-
ator with respect to ω. To bypass purely technical concerns with measurability and
integrability, assume Ω ﬁnite. Also, attainment of extremal values is tacitly assumed.
While still facing uncertainty, the agent wants to maximize the expectation of his
payoﬀ π(k,ω,∆k,r,c). If operating in autarchy, isolated from others, he should
maximize Eπ(k,ω,∆k,r,c) subject to k ≤ ¯ k, r ≤ e(ω),c ≤ f(k,ω,∆k,r).( 1 )
Here and elsewhere we do not mention evident sign restrictions like k, r, c ≥ 0. Note
that problem (1) has two stages. First, k must be sunk before knowing ω.S e c o n d ,
after ω and e(ω) are unveiled, the decision maker had better
maximize π(k,ω,∆k,r,c) subject to r ≤ e(ω) and c ≤ f(k,ω,∆k,r).
Several sorts of uncertainty may prevail, be it in preferences, productivity, or resource
abundance. Format (1) is generic and quite general, able to accommodate manifold
instances. In particular, if capital adjustment comes at prohibitive cost, ∆k is not
mentioned. Similarly, when e is missing, r should be omitted.
Admittedly, for realistic analysis, the planning horizon should extend beyond two
stages. It had better do so partly, because uncertainty is unveiled gradually, over
many steps - and partly, because there are repeated opportunities to take recourse
actions. Such complexity notwithstanding, if one is willing to work in suitably high
dimensions, problem format (1) is rich enough to comprise as many stages and com-
modities as deemed necessary; see [12]. For our purpose it suﬃces to think of all
future intervals as compressed into a single second period. Doing so simpliﬁes things,
and more so when several agents come on stage simultaneously - as described in
the next section. The short time horizon seems particularly appropriate there be-
cause agents, who face substantial uncertainty, hesitate to make more than limited
contractual commitments into the future.
3. Stochastic Production Games
Accommodated henceforth is a ﬁxed, ﬁnite set I of agents, each of the prototypical
sort just described. Agent i ∈ I proceeds step-wise, in the following order: First,
he installs capacity ki. Next, he observes ω and ei(ω). Thereafter, he makes capital
adjustment ∆ki, uses resource ri, and produces output fi(ki,ω,∆ki,r i). Finally, it is
time for him to consume ci and collect payoﬀ πi(ki,ω,∆ki,r i,c i).
The interaction among several such agents is modelled next by various cooperative
games. Each such game associates a real value VS to every coalition S ⊆ I. The
mapping S 7→ VS is called the characteristic function o ft h eg a m ei nq u e s t i o n . A
payment scheme (ui) ∈ RI is then said to be in the core iﬀ it entails
Pareto eﬃciency:
P
i∈I ui = VI and
no blocking:
P
i∈S ui ≥ VS for all S ⊂ I.Investment, Uncertainty, and Production Games 5
The eﬃciency constraint requires that the overall value VI be attained and fully
shared. The no blocking constraint captures that a dissatisﬁed coalition S,o ﬀered
merely
P
i∈S ui <V S, would reject that proposal (or defect from the others).
Instead of autarchy, as described in Section 2, suppose now that the agents can
trade/exchange inputs and outputs among themselves. If kS := (ki)i∈S and ω are
given at the second stage, then coalition S can achieve ex post value
vS(kS,ω): =m a x
½ P







i∈S fi(ki,ω,∆ki,r i), (2)
maximum taken with respect to (∆ki,r i,c i)i∈S. Ex ante the same coalition could
shoot for value








¯ ki =: ¯ kS
)
. (3)
Clearly, these values, be it VS = vS(kS,ω) or VS = vS(¯ kS), are superadditive; that is,
VS ≥ VS + VSÂS whenver S Ã S ⊆ I.
This inequality indicates gains to be had by coordinating investment and consump-
tion. So we ask: Can all cooperative beneﬁts be achieved? If so, in what manner?
Can some voluntary contract be instrumental? Is it easy to implement? And how
does it aﬀect investment decisions in the ﬁrst place?
Under some natural, standing assumptions all these questions have positive or
constructive answers - as will be brought out next. Those assumptions include that
for each ω the contingent functions πi,f i be concave in the other variables, and that
each πi be increasing in (ri,c i).
First-stage cooperation (3) anticipates that second-stage cooperation (2) will fol-
low. Such anticipation makes it natural to disentangle one from the other:
Proposition 1. (Ex post contingent core solutions) For the grand coalition S = I,
given capacity proﬁle k := (ki)i∈I and realization ω, let Λr(k,ω), Λc(k,ω),be a La-
grange multipliers associated to the ﬁrst and second constraint in (2). This means
that the standard Lagrangian L(k,ω,∆k,r,c,λ): =
X
i∈I
{πi(ki,ω,∆ki,r i,c i)+λr [ei(ω) − ri]+λc [fi(ki,ω,∆ki,r i) − ci]},
after inserting λ := [λr,λc]=[ Λr(k,ω),Λc(k,ω)], should satisfy
max
∆k,r,c
L(k,ω,∆k,r,c,λ) ≤ vI(kI,ω). (4)
If so, the state-dependent payment scheme ui(k,ω): =
max
∆ki,ri,ci
{πi(ki,ω,∆ki,r i,c i)+λr(k,ω)[ei(ω) − ri]+Λc(k,ω)[fi(ki,ω,∆ki,r i) − ci]}Investment, Uncertainty, and Production Games 6
belongs to the core of the second-stage, contingent game having characteristic function
S 7→ vS(kS,ω), as deﬁned in (2). When
P
i∈I [ei(ω),f i(ki,ω,0,e i(ω))] >> 0, there do





µ(¯ ki − ki).
Proposition 2. (Ex ante core solution) For the grand coalition S = I, suppose
ω 7→ λr(ω),λc(ω) a r eL a g r a n g em u l t i p l i e rp r o ﬁles associated to the ﬁrst and second










L(k,ω,∆k,r,c,λ,µ) ≤ vI(¯ kI). (5)
Then the payment scheme Ui(¯ ki,
P










λc(ω)[fi(ki,ω,∆ki,r i) − ci]+





constitutes an overall core solution for the game having characteristic function S 7→




ei(ω),f i(¯ ki,ω,0,e i(ω))
¤
>> 0 almost surely, and
¯ kI > 0, there do exist Lagrange multipliers ω 7→ λr(ω),λc(ω) and µ. ¤
One should not be lured into thinking that commonplace multipliers, furnished by
necessary optimality conditions for problems (2), (3), automatically generate core
imputations via (6). Rather, what imports here is that assumptions (4), (5) have the
nature of suﬃcient optimality conditions. To satisfy these it largely helps to have
πi,f i concave for each ω.
The above propositions, proven in Appendix, show how agents, having convex pref-
erences and stochastic assets, can pool inputs, outputs and endowments to smoothen
and insure individual payoﬀs across eventualities and time [14]. Individual projects
can thus share risks - and occasionally even eliminate them. In particular, this holds
when parties are few and risks idiosyncrati c ,s ot h a tn e i t h e rt h el a wo fl a r g en u m -
bers nor the Arrow-Lind theorem apply [3]. The main instruments for risk sharing
are endogenous prices. These emerge as Lagrange multipliers, and they equilibrate
intrinsic markets [22]. At those markets all parties are construed as price-takers.
One may rightly claim that Propositions 1&2 merely ”rediscover” - or, just apply
- known welfare properties of competitive equilibrium, stemming from its residence
within the core. That viewpoint is certainly useful, but not quite necessary. In
fact, Shapley-Shubik’s cooperative perspective on market games largely suﬃces [22].
Important and novel in that perspective is presence of two stages - and associated
recourse options, exercised as events unfold. Particularly interesting are diﬀerential
impacts of uncertainty on various projects. We address that issue next.Investment, Uncertainty, and Production Games 7
4. Covariance-Pricing of Projects
Let ∆ˆ ki, ˆ ri,ˆ ci denote optimal (so-called recourse) decisions, assumed unique and well
deﬁned, in (6). Write brieﬂy fi(ki,ω) for fi(ki,ω,∆ˆ ki, ˆ ri). The two terms λrei and
λcfi(ki) are in focus here. These record the reimbursements to i for his endowment and
output respectively. To inquire about the nature of these pecuniary items, recall that
two random variables X,Y are declared negatively dependent (or brieﬂy −dependent)
if for all values x,y
Pr[X ≤ x,Y ≤ y] ≤ Pr[X ≤ x]Pr[Y ≤ y].
Equivalently, there is negative dependence if Pr[X ≤ x|Y ≤ y] ≤ Pr[X ≤ x]. In
short, knowing Y small, reduces the likelihood that X also be small. Positive depen-
dence (brieﬂy +dependence) obtains when Pr[X ≤ x,Y ≤ y] ≥ Pr[X ≤ x]Pr[Y ≤ y]
for all x,y.
Proposition 3. (Dependence and covariance [19]) If X,Y are negatively (posi-
tively) dependent and D : R → R is strictly decreasing, then X,D(Y ) are oppositely
dependent, and the sign of cov(X,Y) is −1( + 1respectively). ¤
The multipliers λr and λc in (6) are random, but depend also on the aggregate en-
dowment eI and output fI :=
P
i∈I fi respectively. Ceteris paribus that dependence
shows up as ”inverse demand curves” eI 7→ λr(eI), fI 7→ λc(fI). It is commonplace
that such curves be decreasing. Not surprisingly, this property obtains here also:
Proposition 4. (Monotonicity of shadow prices) The inverse demand curves eI 7→
λr(eI), fI 7→ λc(fI) are both decreasing. That is, almost surely
[eI − ¯ eI][λr(eI) − λr(¯ eI)] ≤ 0 whenever eI 6=¯ eI,and (7)
£
fI − ¯ fI
¤£
λc(fI) − λc( ¯ fI)
¤
≤ 0 whenever fI 6= ¯ fI.( 8 )
Proof. The reduced Lagrangian function L(k,ω,λ): =m a x ∆k,r,c L(k,ω,∆k,r,c,λ)
is concave with respect to eI and fI. Consequently, the corresponding partial deriva-
tives λr = ∂
∂eIL(k,ω) and λc = ∂
∂fIL(k,ω) are decreasing. ¤
Combining Proposition 3 with strict versions of inequalities (7), (8) we get:
Proposition 5. (Dependence between shadow prices individual supply) Quite natu-
rally suppose that the inverse demand curve eI 7→ λr(eI) be strictly decreasing. Then,
if eI,e i are one-sided dependent, λr,e i are oppositely dependent. So, if eI,e i are ∓
dependent, then cov(λr,e i) has opposite sign, whence
E [λrei] > (<) E [λr]E [ei].
In ﬁnance jargon, ∓dependence between eI,e i,confers a ”β-value” on ei of opposite
sign. In short ∓dependence, yields a corresponding ± bonus.Investment, Uncertainty, and Production Games 8
If fI 7→ λc(fI) is strictly decreasing, quite similar statements obtain for λc and fI. ¤
If for example, under autarchy, standard present-value calculations proves project
i ”in the money”, but fI,f i a r ep o s i t i v e l yd e p e n d e n t ,t h e ni tb e t t e rb ef a i r l y” d e e p





πi(ki,ω,∆ˆ ki, ˆ ri,ˆ ci)+λc(ω)fi(ki,ω,∆ˆ ki, ˆ ri)
i
.























For illustration consider now a simple, tractable instance where project i contributes
a steady income ﬂow ϕi over the time interval [0,T i]. Since revenues are discounted












Let Ti := ri/ϕi where ri ≥ 0 denotes the amount of resources devoted to project i.





where ϕi = Φi(ki,ω) ≥ 0. For simple notation write ϕI :=
P
i∈I ϕi. Also for simplicity,
take πi(ki,ω,c i,r i)=ci.A g e n ti receives endowment ei(ω) at the second stage, this
yielding aggregate eI :=
P
i∈I ei.A tt h a ts t a g e ,g i v e nkS =( ki)i∈S and ω,c o a l i t i o n
S ⊆ I could achieve













by pooling its members’ objectives, technologies, and endowments. Let λr(ω) ≥ 0




i∈I ei(ω). This state-dependent





{fi(ki,ω,r i)+λr(ω)[ei(ω) − ri]} ≤ vI(k,ω).
Simple calculations show that λr =e x p ( −ρeI/ϕI) hence λr is strictly decreasing in
eI, and Proposition 5 applies:
• If eI,e i are negatively (positively) dependent, then cov(λr,e i) has opposite sign.Investment, Uncertainty, and Production Games 9
Simple calculations also show that






Agents with relatively large ϕi will thus take substantial parts of eI. Such linear
sharing is known from mutual insurance when ϕi denotes the risk tolerance of agent
i; see [4], [19], [23]. The advantages of pooling not perfectly correlated risks are
evident. In fact, accidentally ”starving” agents are helped by more fortunate fellows.
T h er e c e i v e r sw i l lr e c i p r o c a t eo n c ep r o v i d e nce smiles to them. The resulting ex post
payment
ui(k,ω): =s u p
ri
{fi(ki,ω,r i)+λr(ω)[ei(ω) − ri]}







second, the net ﬁnancial transfer









Since these transfers sum to zero, the second-stage, total value equals
P
i∈I fi(ki,ω, ˆ ri).
As one might expect,


















T h el a s ti n e q u a l i t yh o l d sf o ra l lk and ω. It stems from
R T
0 e−ρtdt being strictly concave














this attesting to the advantage of pooling resources. Uncertainty is likely to enforce
this feature, and especially so when all risks are idiosyncratic. To wit, for illustration,
• if each individual endowment ei is random, but their sum eI is not, the gains
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6. Comparative Risk Advantage
David Ricardo - studying international trade, scarce resources, and division of labor
- demonstrated that trading nations all gain by specializing in goods of comparative
advantages [5]. This section takes up a similar issue. Here however, merely one good
comes into play. Accordingly, one might expect that production largely and best
be undertaken by the most eﬃcient agent. Under uncertainty this need not be so.
Indeed, rather ineﬃcient producers may warrant premiums as suppliers of stability
and insurance. This feature becomes particularly pronounced when some ineﬃcient
party’s risk is out of line with others.
To illustrate in a simple setting, assume there is no capacity limit (¯ ki =+ ∞), no
capacity adjustments (∆ki =0 ) , and no endowment (ei =0 ) . Also, instead of payoﬀ
consider cost Ci := −πi with
Ci(ki,ω,c i)=κiki + κ[di − ci]
+ .( 9 )
The operator [r]
+ := max{0,r} preserves the positive part of the real number r.
The parameter di is construed as i0s ”inelastic demand”. If endogenous supply ci
falls short of demand di, the residual amount di −ci must be procured from external




where the parameter Pi ∈ (0,1) is prescribed, and bi(ω) ∈ {0,1} is a binomial vari-
able. The latter takes the value 1 with probability pi ∈ [0,1), leaving then only the
proportion Pi of ki intact. With complementary probability ¯ pi := 1 − pi, all of ki
remains productive. Under autarchy agent i will maximize expected cost
E max
ci
Ci(ki,ω,c i)=κiki + κ
©
pi [di − Piki]
+ +¯ pi [di − ki]
+ª





0 if κi > κ{piPi +¯ pi}
di if κpiPi ≤ κi ≤ κ{piPi +¯ pi}
di/Pi if κi < κpiPi.












































. (10)Investment, Uncertainty, and Production Games 11
Indeed, a minimizing (ci) in F(k) satisﬁes ci ≤ di for all i, whence
P
i∈I [di − ci]
+ = £P
i∈I(di − ci)
¤+ and ˜ F(k) ≤ F(k). Conversely, given a minimizing proﬁle (˜ ci) in ˜ F(k)




i∈I ˜ ci. Hence
£P
i∈I di − ˜ ci
¤+ = P
i∈I [di − ci]
+ so that F(k) ≤ ˜ F(k).
For the sake of transparency, suppose ﬁn a l l yt h a tt h e r eb eo n l yt w oa g e n t s .O b -
jective (10) then takes the reduced form
κ1k1 + κ2k2 + κE
h







We assume κ1 < κ2 < κ and brieﬂy discuss three cooperative cases next:
1) Absent uncertainty,w h e np1 = p2 =0 , we get k1 = d1 + d2 and k2 =0 . Then, to
no surprise, the most eﬃcient agent produces all.
2) Only the eﬃcient agent is at risk;t h a ti s ,p1 > 0,p 2 =0 , in which case (11)
specializes to
κ1k1 + κ2k2 + κ
©
p1 [d1 + d2 − k1P1 − k2]
+ +¯ p1 [d1 + d2 − k1 − k2]
+ª
.
Note that when total supply equals d1 + d2, the expected marginal production costs
are κ1−κ(p1P1+¯ p1) for agent 1 and κ2−κ for agent 2. If the latter is smaller, then,
somewhat surprisingly, the cost eﬃcient agent better be inactive, leaving production
entirely to his high-cost associate (i.e. k1 =0 ,k 2 = d1 + d2). The latter is able to
compensate qua insurer for his own handicaps qua producer.
3) B o t ha r er i s ke x p o s e d ,b u ti np e r f e c t l yo p p o s e dm a n n e r;t h a ti s ,p1 > 0,p 2 =1−p1,
and b1(ω)+b2(ω)=1 . Then (11) reads
κ1k1 + κ2k2 + κ
©
p1 [d1 + d2 − k1P1 − k2]
+ + p2 [d1 + d2 − k1 − k2P2]
+ª
The structure of the optimal solution is similar to the preceding case, but outside
procurement could become more attractive. In particular, if κ1 > κ(p1P1 +¯ p1) and
κ2 > κ(p2P2 +¯ p2), it is not worth anyone’s while to produce.
Nonsmooth objectives like (9), reﬂecting ”hit-or-miss” situations, inspire new mea-
sures of risk, notably so-called Conditional Value-at-Risk [21].
7. Environmental Games and Quota Trade
As noted, the core imputation (6) reduces essentially to competitive equilibrium in
endogenous markets for capital and contingent commodities. One can hardly presume
that human-like players, holding imperfect information/competence, will reach such
equilibrium right away. More realistically, they must adapt and learn. The classical
branch of economics that deals with competitive markets, fails however, to account
for necessary adaptation and learning.
The simplicity of our setting invites reconsideration of these matters. But ﬁrst
it is time to address a related question, already invoked, namely: to what extent isInvestment, Uncertainty, and Production Games 12
uncertainty described or formalized? At this point the necessary prerequisites are few
and reasonable. To wit, suppose a discrete-time process ωt,t=0 ,1,... of independent
random variates, all distributed as the underlying ω, can be simulated or observed
step by step. Then, since endowments and outputs are ﬁxed ex post - and since
income eﬀects are negligible or ignored - there should be good prospects for reaching
a stable equilibrium over time. Indeed, recent studies explore the convergence of
repeated, bilateral exchange towards an eﬃcient steady state [9], [10], [11], [15].




i∈I ¯ ki =: ¯ kI becomes
crucial. Suppose that ¯ kI reﬂe c t sa na g g r e g a t eu p p e rb o u n do nt h ec a t c ho fv a l u a b l e
ﬁsh, say - or on the emission of greenhouse gases. Hence kI = ¯ kI holds throughout,
and payoﬀs πi(¯ kI,·) could depend on ¯ kI.
An environmental game thus unfolds in which players trade quotas ex ante and
contingent commodities ex post. While adjustment of quotas is sluggish, the other
variables are easily and quickly changed. So, to simplify, suppose that second-
stage markets clear ”instantaneously,” and that ∆ki =0there. As a by-product
this clearing generates Lagrange multipliers λc(ω). It also gives reduced functions
πi(ki,ω): =πi(ki,ω, ˆ ri,ˆ ci) and fi(ki,ω): =fi(ki,ω, ˆ ri,ˆ ci). Let st > 0 be a sequence of









Begin at time t =0 , with s = s0, ω = ω0,k i = ¯ ki, and select two agents i,j ∈ I at
random. From there on the process could evolve iteratively as follows:









Transfer s(mi − mj) to i from j, this giving the two parties new holdings:
ki ← ki + s(mi − mj) and kj ← kj + s(mj − mi).
• Increase time t by 1, update s ← st, and observe a new independent ω ← ωt.
• Continue to pick pairs of agents until convergence.
Convergence obtains as in [9], [10], [15]. Note that trade is voluntary and driven
by perceived prospects for mutual improvements. It happens out of equilibrium, uses
money as instrument, and requires no private information to be revealed. While still
away from equilibrium, the price - and the associated monetary compensation - that
goes along with a bilateral exchange, could result from bargaining. If so, it would be
hard to predict, but depend on the diﬀerence, as reﬂected in mi − mi, between i0s
willingness to buy and sell [18].Investment, Uncertainty, and Production Games 13
8. Concluding Remarks
While the preceding model were expressly stylized, less telescopic extensions can easily
incorporate much realism and detail. But any simple, reasonable version already
brings out that stochastic production (or market) games oﬀer manifold opportunities
to put much of economic theory, applied mathematics, and computer science jointly
to good use. A fortiori this holds in market-like settings, much aﬀected by sequential
decisions and uncertainty, not fully grasped by a glimpse in the rear-view mirror.
Several theories, and attending practices, then come on stage simultaneously. And
they supplement each other. Included are ﬁnance, insurance, stochastic optimization
and Mont Carlo simulation. These disciplines have complementary concerns and
perspectives. Together they facilitate a rich analysis - be it positive or normative - of
how players would/should fare. Particularly important is absence or incompleteness
of markets. Internal exchanges, of perfectly Walrasian sort, may then provide some
mitigation. Presence of public goods/bads - or widespread externalities - need not
preclude coordination and relative eﬃciency. Troublesome though, are economies of
scale in which case Lagrange multipliers may not exist [12].
Especially important are concerns with expandability and reversibility of capacity
choice [1], [2], [6], [7], [8], [17]. Such concerns could also be studied within the frames
of stochastic production games. In particular, those games allow estimates of the
value of perfect information [20].
9. Appendix











(This inequality, named weak duality in optimization theory, reﬂects the last-mover
advantage in zero-sum, two-person, noncooperative games.) In the present context,





{πi(ki,ω,∆ki,r i,c i)+λr [ei(ω) − ri]+λc [fi(ki,ω,∆ki,r i) − ci]}















i∈S fi(ki,ω,∆ki,r i); otherwise the minimal





LS(ξ,λ)=vS(kS,ω).Investment, Uncertainty, and Production Games 14

















i∈I ui(k,ω) ≥ vI(k,ω). Since the converse inequality holds by as-
sumption, Pareto eﬃciency also obtains. When eI(ω) and
P
i∈I fi(ki,ω,0,e i(ω)) are
both positive, the Slater condition holds - hence existence of multipliers is ensured. ¤




πi(ki,ω,∆ki,r i,c i)+λr [ei(ω) − ri]+λc [fi(ki,ω,∆ki,r i) − ci]+µ(¯ ki − ki)
ª

















i∈S fi(ki,ω,∆ki,r i) almost surely, and
P
i∈S ki ≤ P
i∈S ¯ ki; otherwise the minimal expected value equals −∞. Consequently, still writing









LS = vS(¯ kS).






















LS = vS(¯ kS).
In particular,
P
i∈I Ui ≥ vI(¯ kI). Since the converse inequality holds by assumption,
Pareto eﬃciency again obtains. The presumed positivity guarantees that the Slater
condition holds. ¤
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